WATER MAIN BREAK INCIDENT REPORT FROM MT. ZION PSD

July 19-21, 2026

Prepared for the Calhoun County Commission and the Public

Aryeh White

Board Secretary

Mount Zion Public Service District

July 27, 2026

This report presents the incident chronology, the conditions that delayed restoration of service, and recommended corrective actions with a primary focus on incidents that caused appreciable delays in the restoration of water service.

1. Purpose and Basis of Report

This report documents the July 19-21, 2026 water-main failure affecting portions of the Mount Zion Public Service District. It is intended to provide the Commission and the public with a clear account of what occurred, how service was restored, which conditions delayed restoration, and what corrective actions are recommended.

The chronology was assembled from operational group messages, public notices, telemetry records, photographs, field observations, call-record recollections, contractor activity, and participant recollections. Times identified as approximate reflect the best available reconstruction where a contemporaneous timestamp was not available. Employee names are omitted because individual identity is not necessary to understand the incident or the corrective actions.

2. Executive Summary

At approximately 6:30 a.m. on Sunday, July 19, 2026, low pressure was observed in the Mount Zion PSD system. Fresh telemetry obtained shortly afterward showed pumps operating continuously while the Millstone Hill and Po Gunn tanks were nearly depleted. The loss exceeded the available pumping capacity and was ultimately estimated at approximately 300 gallons per minute.

Through staged valve closures and repeated pressure tests, the response team localized the failure to a section bounded by the Arnoldsburg Y, the Sand Ridge booster station, and the Millstone Hill PRV by the afternoon of July 19. The visible leak was located on the morning of July 20 on private property along US 119/33. Excavation exposed a failed bell-and-spigot joint in an 8-inch water main at a depth of approximately seven feet. The bell was longitudinally split and the gasket had been displaced. The main was surrounded by construction debris and large broken concrete pieces, and portions appeared to have been laid against or directly above rock without adequate bedding. These conditions substantially increased the difficulty and duration of excavation and repair. Poor bedding and contact with rock are presently suspected as the proximate cause of the failure, although no formal engineering root-cause determination has been made.

Repair work was completed on July 21. Repressurization began at 1:59 p.m., and the District announced full restoration to the affected system at 4:07 p.m. Service was restored cautiously and in stages to avoid pressure shock and additional failures. The Sand Ridge tank was refilled during the following hour, with refill confirmed by the operator at 4:49 p.m. The boil-water advisory was included in the 4:07 p.m. public restoration notice, and OneCall advisory calls and texts were issued at 4:37 p.m. Flushing and water-quality procedures continued after pressure returned.

• The Philips Run segment remained pressurized throughout the incident and was not placed under the boil-water advisory.

• The Ridge experienced reduced pressure but did not lose water. The Sand Ridge tank never fell below approximately two feet, so the Sassafras Ridge and Russet branch remained fully pressurized; one customer at approximately the same elevation as the tank would have experienced reduced pressure. The boil-water advisory for Sassafras Ridge and Russet resulted from refilling the Sand Ridge tank with water from a section already under advisory, not from a loss of pressure in that branch.

• System metering indicates approximately 818,900 gallons entered the system during the incident period; this total includes customer use, tank refill, and water lost through the break.

• Five cases of bottled water were delivered to high-risk customers. A bulk-water distribution point became operational shortly before system restoration; no customers arrived for bulk water before restoration was announced.

3. System Context and Effects

Mount Zion PSD receives water through a master meter from the Town of Grantsville. The system is sequential: each major segment supplies the next, though not always from the end of the prior segment, so loss of water in an upstream segment can affect multiple downstream tanks and pressure zones. Po Gunn and Millstone Hill form a shared storage zone and are hydraulically linked during normal system operation. Major storage includes Barr Hill (67,500 gallons), Po Gunn (100,000 gallons), Millstone Hill (125,000 gallons), and Sand Ridge (115,000 gallons). The Philips Run and Mount Zion pump stations each have an approximate pumping capacity of 100 gallons per minute.

The final estimated leak rate was nearly three times the capacity of either individual pump station. This made tank recovery impossible while the failed section remained connected and required repeated isolation, refill, and pressure-testing cycles. Difficulty locating and correctly identifying sectional valves and exact line routes increased the number of diagnostic tests and the area affected by individual tests, thereby increasing the time required for full restoration of service.

4. Complete Incident Timeline

The following timeline distinguishes recorded times from approximate or reconstructed times. Public notices are included because they document the information available to customers at each stage of the response.

Date and time	Event
Antecedent conditions – before July 19	During a heat wave, pump operating times increased at both upstream pumping stages. Normal tank recovery and increased pool filling made legitimate demand a plausible explanation, although the sustained increase was later recognized as an early indication of abnormal water loss.
Approximately one week before July 19	The owner of the eventual failure property encountered unusually wet ground and became stuck with a light utility tractor. The tractor could not reasonably have caused a failure of a main nearly seven feet deep, and elevated pump runtimes had already begun. The owner knew of the shared right-of-way because of the sewer line but did not know that a water main also crossed the property.
Sunday, July 19 – 6:58 a.m.	The PSD operator received a direct call from a customer reporting low pressure at the customer’s residence.
7:24 a.m.	The telemetry system was restarted to force a fresh data poll. The new data showed the Millstone Hill and Po Gunn storage zone nearly empty and pumps operating continuously.
Shortly after 7:24 a.m.	The response team concluded that a major leak was present. Early field estimates placed the loss at roughly 100-200 gallons per minute; later system analysis produced an estimate of approximately 300 gallons per minute.
9:02 a.m.	The operator reported in the operational group conversation that a substantial leak was draining Ridge storage and requested assistance locating it.
9:26-9:35 a.m.	Additional responders offered to check reported areas. Initial search directions included Sycamore Road and Memory Lane while the operator remained the only PSD field worker in the field.
9:48-9:56 a.m.	The operator requested a public notice asking customers to report major water flow and warning of possible loss of service. The notice was published and customer reports began to be evaluated.
10:10-10:15 a.m.	Community reports were compared with the observed tank depletion. The crew was looking for a loss exceeding 100 gallons per minute and likely involving a main.
10:38-10:48 a.m.	An additional responder joined at the operations and maintenance building after the GMC transmission slipped repeatedly and was judged unsafe for continued response use. Anticipated tools and equipment were transferred to the Dodge service vehicle.
11:35-11:39 a.m.	The Millstone pressure-reducing station was closed after initial searching. Upstream storage began to recover, confirming that the dominant loss was downstream of the station and narrowing the search area.
11:42 a.m.-12:11 p.m.	The crew attempted to locate the sectional valve intended to separate the Upper West Fork extension from the US 119/33 and Arnoldsburg section. The valve could not be located during this search.
12:29 p.m.	A public update reported that low pressure had first been noticed early that morning, that a major leak had been identified, and that the District was attempting to isolate it.
About 12:30 p.m.	Personnel returned to the office to obtain a subterranean tracer-wire locator and consult available system maps. Photographs of the maps were taken at 12:39 p.m. for field use. The affected main had no usable tracer wire, limiting the locator’s value.
Early afternoon	The crew continued searching with a metal detector and hand tools for the sectional valve intended to isolate the West Fork portion of the system. The valve could not be located in time to support that test.
2:05 p.m.	Because the preferred West Fork sectional could not be found, the sectional before the Arnoldsburg Y was closed, isolating Arnoldsburg and Upper West Fork while the US 119/33 portion was tested.
2:06 p.m.	A public update stated: “We are about to restore water to customers East of the Arnoldsburg Y. If the leak isn’t in that part of the system we are going to start turning on additional sections until we find it. We appreciate your patience.” In context, the restoration was a diagnostic test intended to determine whether the leak was within that portion of the system.
2:06-3:37 p.m.	The tested portion was repressurized gradually to limit hydraulic shock and determine whether it would hold pressure. Additional valves were searched for and operated as the test proceeded.
6:22 p.m.	A report relayed through the 911 center described a Sinking Springs customer as having gained and then lost water. Sinking Springs is on the Ridge, where pressure was reduced but water was not lost. Pressure had substantially recovered by the time the report reached the response group. The circumstances suggest that the report may have described an earlier condition and that some detail may have shifted as it passed through several people, an ordinary limitation of relayed emergency communications that must be considered when interpreting such reports.
6:50 p.m.	Pressure in the tested area failed to hold. The Millstone station was closed again so upstream storage could recover for another isolation and pressure test.
8:37 p.m.	A sectional valve near the Route 16/US 119/33 intersection was closed. The response team mistakenly believed that it isolated the entire US 119/33 corridor, but it closed only the section east of the intersection and did not isolate the segment between the intersection and the Arnoldsburg Y, where the leak was later found.
8:52 p.m.	A field estimate was made for the volume of the segment believed to have been isolated. The estimate was reasonable for the assumed segment, but the assumed isolation boundary was incorrect.
8:55-9:32 p.m.	Food and drinking water were delivered to the field crew. All field search and system-recovery work was halted at dark. The crew reviewed the day’s isolation results and planned the next morning’s search.
9:37 p.m.	Based on the mistaken understanding of the 8:37 p.m. valve closure, a public update incorrectly stated that the leak had been narrowed to Route 16 between Left Fork Road and the US 119/33 intersection. The update did not account for the US 119/33 segment between the intersection and the Arnoldsburg Y, which remained connected and contained the leak.
Monday, July 20 – 6:42-7:40 a.m.	Workers, assisting personnel, the PSD excavator, flaggers, and possible outside assistance were contacted or placed on standby. The District coordinated with an outside excavation contractor in case contractor equipment would be needed after the leak was located. Flaggers were ready to respond but were later determined to be unnecessary because the leak was away from the roadway.
6:52-7:16 a.m.	A customer report of no water, a running meter, and air beneath a house was relayed. The report did not fit the assumed valve configuration, and the available record does not establish whether it was related to the main break.
7:58 a.m.	The field crew returned to the Millstone Hill creek and drainage area and resumed the search in the area then believed to contain the leak.
About 8:45 a.m.	The crew concluded that trace chlorine, small visible flows, and broad acoustic flow indications along Millstone Hill could not account for the principal system loss and had not localized the failure to a single point.
Shortly before 9:00 a.m.	A private residence west of the valve believed to isolate the entire US 119/33 corridor reported water pressure. That pressure should have been impossible under the assumed valve interpretation. The report disproved the assumed isolation boundary and redirected the search farther west along US 119/33.
Shortly before 9:20 a.m.	The operator and a field employee drove west on US 119/33 toward the reporting residence. The employee riding in the passenger seat spotted the leak in a low roadside location partly obscured from the driver by terrain.
9:20 a.m.	The visible failure was confirmed on private property along US 119/33 near Bee Fork. The water discharge was clearly visible from beyond the undermined area.
Morning	The available map showed a sectional valve near Bee Fork less than 100 feet upstream of the failure. Personnel searched for it with local assistance, a metal detector, and hand tools, but it was not located in time to isolate the break more closely.
11:01 a.m.	The PSD’s excavator arrived and initial excavation began.
About 11:45 a.m.	The available small pump was not removing water fast enough, and two larger District pumps were not immediately operable. Before a replacement-pump trip was made, the crew used the excavator bucket to bail water from the excavation.
1:27 p.m.	The main was briefly reopened because the crew was having difficulty locating the pipe within the excavation. The flow helped identify the pipe position but also reflooded the excavation.
3:31 p.m.	Immediately before 3:31 p.m., the lines were reopened very briefly a second time to help locate the pipe, causing a second reflooding of the excavation. At 3:31 p.m., the pipe was located with a probe through more than two feet of debris and fill. It had not yet been fully exposed.
Late afternoon and evening	Excavation continued through dirty fill containing cinder blocks, pieces of poured concrete slab, remains of garbage bags, cattle bones, broken glass, and other refuse. Debris periodically slid down the excavation walls and had to be removed repeatedly. Large concrete pieces and rock required mechanical breaking and removal, and the repair could not be completed that day.
Tuesday, July 21 – By 7:00 a.m.	The PSD operator was on scene and repair preparations resumed.
Later that morning, shortly before 9:43 a.m.	The outside contractor arrived with a dump truck carrying clean fill, then departed to retrieve the contractor’s excavator. This visit immediately preceded the public announcement that the excavator was en route.
9:43 a.m.	A public update stated that the private contractor’s excavator was en route and that repair work would resume.
11:25 a.m.	A public update announced plans for a water-distribution point at the former PSD office and stated that limited bottled water would be delivered to customers unable to obtain bulk water.
About 1:30 p.m.	The required repair components were in place. Final assembly was delayed approximately 30 minutes while a torque wrench that remained in the other service vehicle was obtained.
1:59 p.m.	Pressure was reintroduced into the repaired line. Filling and flushing began.
2:00-2:01 p.m.	A public update was prepared. Customers were instructed to flush cold water through a bathtub or similar high-flow fixture for approximately five minutes once service returned.
2:13 p.m.	A public update announced that the repair was complete and that the system was being flushed and repressurized. Water remained available at the former PSD office.
3:52-3:54 p.m.	Customers began reporting restored service. The operator reported that all affected customers should have water while flushing continued toward the ends of the system.
4:05 p.m.	Customers were advised that water might appear milky because of entrained air introduced during repressurization.
4:07 p.m.	The District announced that service had been restored throughout the affected system. The public notice also placed affected areas under a boil-water advisory. Philips Run had never lost pressure and was not included in the advisory.
4:37 p.m.	OneCall boil-water-advisory calls and text messages were issued to affected customers.
4:49 p.m.	The operator confirmed by text message that the Sand Ridge tank had been refilled. The tank had never fallen below approximately two feet, and the Sassafras Ridge and Russet branch remained pressurized throughout the incident. Its boil-water advisory resulted from refill with water from an area already under advisory, not from loss of pressure.
Late afternoon and evening	Flushing continued at system ends. The water-distribution point became operational shortly before the restoration announcement. Five cases of bottled water were delivered to high-risk customers; no customers arrived for bulk water before restoration was announced.
Since restoration	Post-repair tank monitoring, flushing, pressure checks, water-quality sampling, boil-water-advisory procedures, cost accounting, valve-location work, and other corrective activities have continued as required.

5. Conditions That Delayed Restoration and Recommended Remediation

The conditions below either delayed leak localization, delayed physical repair, or required restoration to proceed more slowly. Some were deficiencies that can be corrected; others were inherent system constraints that must be planned for. A general completion horizon is listed for corrective work already underway. A conditional horizon is included only where specifically noted for a proposed action.

1. Sectional valves could not be located quickly

Condition. Several sectional valves were buried, obscured, inaccurately represented on available maps, or associated with damaged valve boxes and risers. The West Fork sectional could not be found during the first day despite an extended search with a metal detector and hand tools. Road-maintenance damage to valve risers has contributed to this condition in multiple locations.

Effect on restoration. The inability to isolate smaller sections forced the District to shut off larger areas, refill upstream storage between tests, and repeat pressure-testing cycles. This materially prolonged leak localization.

Recommended remediation. Locate, uncover, identify, and permanently mark all critical sectional valves; repair or replace damaged risers and boxes; record GPS coordinates and photographs; maintain printed and offline maps; and exercise every system valve at least annually, with fire-protection valves exercised semiannually. Coordinate with road authorities so valve structures are protected and restored after roadway work.

Implementation status. Started. Critical-valve location and marking: weeks to months. Systemwide valve location, mapping, and initial exercise cycle: months to years.

2. Incomplete and inaccessible system mapping

Condition. Available paper maps were incomplete for field isolation, and credentials for the existing MOVRC digital mapping system were not readily available. Field personnel had to return to the office, photograph maps, and reconcile them with ground conditions.

Effect on restoration. Time was lost obtaining and interpreting maps while the system continued to drain. Uncertainty regarding valve function and line routing also increased the number of isolation tests required.

Recommended remediation. Recover and preserve access credentials; update the digital map with GPS coordinates for valves, meters, pump stations, tanks, hydrants, and other surface assets; attach photographs and access notes; maintain a current printed emergency atlas in each service vehicle and at the office; and designate responsibility for updating both copies after field work.

Implementation status. Started. Completion horizon: months.

3. Sequential system topology and depletion of upstream storage

Condition. Because of the population distribution and terrain served by the District, major system segments feed the next pressure zone in sequence. The leak rate exceeded the capacity of the individual pump stations and drew down upstream storage while the failed section remained connected. Additional sectional valves on the West Fork extension would improve future isolation, but their absence did not materially delay this response.

Effect on restoration. The response team had to close the downstream system and allow upstream tanks and lines to recover between diagnostic tests. Those refill periods were necessary to obtain meaningful pressure results and constituted a substantial part of the time required to locate the leak.

Recommended remediation. Obtain engineering review of methods to preserve upstream tank storage during a major downstream failure. Continue to document and pursue additional sectional valves on the West Fork extension as a resilience improvement, while recognizing that this need did not delay the July response. Continue actively pursuing an extension to the Clay County line that would permit an emergency interconnect with the Clay County PSD system. The interconnect would provide a second water source and, during a major failure, could allow water to enter the Mount Zion PSD system from the far end of the West Fork segment and be pumped toward Mount Zion Ridge and Sand Ridge. The proposed Millstone pressure-reducing-station modification is addressed separately below.

Implementation status. Additional West Fork sectionalization remains recommended without a completion timeframe. The Clay County line extension and emergency interconnect project is underway: the District is pursuing congressionally directed funding, and, with assistance from the Calhoun County Commission, a preliminary engineering report is nearly complete. Completion horizon: years.

4. Telemetry limitations and stale-data behavior

Condition. The telemetry interface can continue displaying stale information after a sensor communication fault without clearly indicating that communications have failed until the system is manually restarted. Some remote pumping and storage locations, including the Sassafras Ridge/Sand Ridge portion, do not provide the same level of real-time operating information and may require manual control.

Effect on restoration. The response initially required a telemetry restart to establish actual tank and pump conditions. Limited remote visibility complicated tank recovery and post-restoration pressure management.

Recommended remediation. Configure the system to display data age clearly, alarm when communications fail, and force or request a fresh poll without a full restart. Expand telemetry to critical pumps, tanks, and pressure zones; add abnormal pump-runtime and rapid tank-loss alarms; and retain manual gauges and procedures as a backup.

Implementation status. Started as part of the District improvement project. Completion horizon: years.

5. Proposed automatic isolation at the Millstone pressure-reducing station

Condition. Under normal operation, positive pressure should remain downstream of the Millstone pressure-reducing valve. During a major downstream failure, continued flow through the station can drain upstream tanks until the valve is closed manually. The planned replacement station does not yet have an approved provision to close automatically when it detects vacuum or loss of positive pressure in the lower system.

Effect on restoration. The major leak continued to consume available storage until manual isolation occurred, leaving less water available for diagnostic testing and requiring longer tank-recovery intervals between tests.

Recommended remediation. As part of engineering design for the new Millstone station, evaluate an automatic shutoff triggered by downstream vacuum or loss of positive pressure. The design must be reviewed to ensure that it does not impair firefighting flow under extreme demand and must include a controlled override so operators can reopen the station for leak-location testing. Any approved function should be tested and incorporated into written operating procedures.

Implementation status. The Millstone station replacement is part of the water-improvement project already underway. If the engineer approves this modification, the anticipated completion horizon is approximately two years.

6. Leak location was not visibly apparent & water-main crossing unknown to the landowner

Condition. The failed main was nearly seven feet deep, and much of the lost water traveled through subsurface voids rather than emerging as an obvious surface break. The property owner is a sewer-only customer using a private well. He was aware of the PSD right-of-way because the sewer line crossed the property, but he did not know that a water main also crossed the property. He therefore had no reason to associate wet ground or equipment difficulty with the water system.

Effect on restoration. The District did not receive an early landowner report from the eventual failure site, and the search relied on broad system isolation, acoustic testing, and repeated field inspection.

Recommended remediation. Notify affected landowners where mains and rights-of-way cross private property; provide clear leak-reporting instructions; install durable route or right-of-way markers where practical; add right-of-way information to customer records and maps; and use portable pressure loggers or temporary flow meters to supplement acoustic detection on long sections.

Implementation status. Proposed. Completion horizon: months if implemented.

7. Improper bedding and inadequate pipe support

Condition. The failed main lacked uniform clean bedding and appeared to be in contact with or immediately above rock. The joint had been subjected to poor support conditions, and the pipe had to be realigned and properly bedded before return to service.

Effect on restoration. After the failed joint was exposed, rock had to be removed and the pipe alignment and support corrected before the joint could be assembled and safely returned to service. This added work beyond the mechanical joint repair itself. Contact between the main and rock may also have been the proximate cause of the leak itself, although no formal engineering root-cause determination has been made.

Recommended remediation. Require clean, specified bedding and backfill for every repair; photograph excavations before and after repair; record observed original-installation deficiencies in a consistent format; improve documentation of deficient main segments so future funding applications can support early replacement; have engineering staff identify corridors with repeated evidence of poor bedding or flexed mains; and incorporate targeted replacement or stabilization into future capital projects when justified and fundable.

Implementation status. Ongoing. Documentation of improper bedding, rock contact, improper fill, and other affected-segment deficiencies is continuing jointly with Item 8. Completion depends on securing funding for replacement of the affected segment.

8. Dirty fill and large debris complicated excavation

Condition. The trench backfill contained cinder blocks, pieces of poured concrete slab, remains of garbage bags, cattle bones, broken glass, and other refuse. As excavation progressed, this dirty fill and debris periodically slid down the excavation walls and had to be removed repeatedly. Large concrete pieces also required mechanical breaking.

Effect on restoration. Removing, breaking, and handling the improper fill substantially slowed excavation and delayed access to the failed joint. The improper fill was the excavation condition that materially extended repair time.

Recommended remediation. Specify clean bedding and backfill for all District repairs; document and photograph improper existing fill when encountered; ensure emergency excavation arrangements include equipment capable of breaking and removing large debris; and use the resulting records to identify segments that may warrant earlier replacement or stabilization.

Implementation status. Ongoing. Documentation of improper fill, bedding, rock contact, and other affected-segment deficiencies is continuing jointly with Item 7. Completion depends on securing funding for replacement of the affected segment.

9. Dependence on outside excavation equipment and contractor mobilization

Condition. The PSD excavator was used for the initial excavation, but the depth, rock, large debris, and required breaking work exceeded what could be completed efficiently with District equipment alone. An outside contractor therefore had to mobilize additional excavation and breaking equipment and provide any additional safety equipment required for the contractor’s own personnel.

Effect on restoration. Initial excavation proceeded with the PSD excavator, but completion required additional contractor equipment and capability after the site conditions were understood. Contractor mobilization and the need to resume work with the larger equipment added time. Flaggers were placed on call but were not needed after the leak was located away from the roadway; flagger availability did not delay the repair.

Recommended remediation. Establish written emergency contact and call-out arrangements with at least a primary and alternate excavation contractor; identify available excavators, breakers, pumps, and other heavy equipment; explore practical rental options for equipment that is not economical for the District to own; identify retired pipeliners and other experienced community members who may be willing and qualified to assist; require outside helpers and contractors to provide the additional safety equipment needed for their own personnel; prearrange after-hours contact methods and authorization; identify traffic-control resources for incidents that do affect the roadway; and review the list annually.

Implementation status. Recommended. No completion timeframe assigned.

10. Service-vehicle and tool readiness problems

Condition. The lower-mileage GMC service vehicle had a slipping transmission and could not be relied upon safely. The substitute Dodge had multiple mechanical defects. Tools were divided between vehicles, and needed items-including a torque wrench, spud bar, small hammer, and metal detector-were not always immediately available at the work site.

Effect on restoration. Vehicle changes consumed time, and the absence of the torque wrench caused an approximately 30-minute delay after repair components were in place. That delay was minor compared with the time consumed by leak localization and excavation, but it was avoidable. Searching for or retrieving other tools also reduced field efficiency.

Recommended remediation. Create a standardized emergency tool inventory and loading checklist; maintain a complete core kit in the primary response vehicle or in a portable ready-to-load module; duplicate inexpensive critical hand tools; assign custody and inspection responsibility; repair or replace unreliable vehicles; and ensure the acoustic leak detector and locator can be deployed without searching multiple vehicles.

Implementation status. Emergency tool checklists and inventories have started; completion horizon: weeks to months. Acquisition of a second complete response tool set is ongoing; completion horizon: months to years. Vehicle repair status: pending diagnostics.

11. Limited staffing and concentration of operating knowledge

Condition. The District has a small workforce, and much of the detailed knowledge of valve function, pressure behavior, pump control, and restoration sequence was concentrated in a small number of people. The lead operator initially worked with limited field support while the incident expanded.

Effect on restoration. The response depended heavily on individual recollection and availability. This slowed simultaneous searching, valve operation, public communication, mapping, and logistics.

Recommended remediation. Continue cross-training field staff and designated board or emergency-support personnel; prepare short facility sheets for every tank, pump station, valve cluster, and pressure zone; write step-by-step procedures for leak isolation, telemetry verification, boil-water notifications, flushing, and staged restoration; and assemble these materials into an operations manual.

Implementation status. Started. Cross-training, response procedures, and facility sheets: months. Complete operations manual: years.

12. Cautious repressurization is an unavoidable feature of water-system restoration

Condition. Any distribution system that has been depressurized contains air and must be refilled carefully. In this incident, aging mains, lengthy dead-end sections, and areas that had been at low or zero pressure increased the consequences of opening valves too quickly. This condition is inherent in water-system operation and cannot be eliminated.

Effect on restoration. Full restoration could not safely occur immediately after the mechanical repair. Lines and tanks had to be filled and flushed slowly and in stages, with pressure monitored as service returned. The time required for this cautious refill was necessary rather than a correctable delay.

Recommended remediation. Continue the District practice of slow, staged repressurization to reduce the risk of water hammer and additional failures. Formalize that practice in a written procedure defining valve sequence, maximum opening rate, pressure checkpoints, flushing locations, air-release actions, customer instructions, and criteria for stopping if pressure behaves unexpectedly. Train all operators and designated support personnel on the procedure.

Implementation status. Started as part of the written-procedure project. Completion horizon: months.

13. Abnormal pump runtimes were not yet supported by segment-pattern analysis

Condition. Pump runtimes increased before the acute outage at the same time that a heat wave and increased pool filling made higher legitimate demand plausible. The increase was an early indication that abnormal water loss may have been developing, but the District did not yet have a developed baseline or analytical tool for distinguishing heat-related or other legitimate use from a leak by comparing the behavior of individual system segments.

Effect on restoration. Because the increased runtimes coincided with conditions that reasonably explained higher customer use, the abnormal pattern did not by itself trigger an early field investigation. A better method for distinguishing legitimate demand from segment-specific loss may allow future leaks to be investigated before they become acute emergencies.

Recommended remediation. Develop a spreadsheet that compares available usage, pump-runtime, flow, and tank-level data for each system segment. The analysis should determine whether segments rise and fall together, which may indicate heat-related or other systemwide legitimate demand, or separately, which may indicate a leak within one segment. Collect seasonal baseline data and define review thresholds so unusual patterns prompt documented investigation.

Implementation status. Started. Spreadsheet development and baseline-data collection are ongoing. At least one full year of baseline data will be required before the comparisons are sufficiently useful for reliable seasonal interpretation; general completion horizon: years.

6. Corrective Projects Already Underway

Only projects already begun are assigned a general completion horizon in this report.

Project	Current objective	Horizon
Critical sectional-valve location and marking	Locate and visibly identify the valves most important to emergency isolation.	Weeks to months
Affected-segment documentation and replacement planning (Items 7 and 8)	Document improper fill, rock contact, and other deficiencies and use the record to support funding for replacement of the affected segment.	Ongoing; completion pending funding
Systemwide valve mapping and initial exercise cycle	Locate, GPS-record, photograph, assess, and begin exercising sectional and other critical valves.	Months to years
Digital system-map recovery and update	Restore MOVRC map access and populate it with verified field data and photographs.	Months
Emergency tool checklists and inventories	Standardize vehicle and portable response-kit inventories, loading checklists, custody, and inspections.	Weeks to months
Cross-training and written operating procedures	Document leak isolation, telemetry verification, flushing, public notice, and staged restoration procedures.	Months
Facility sheets	Prepare concise field references for tanks, pump stations, valve clusters, and pressure zones.	Months
Operations manual	Integrate procedures, facility sheets, contacts, mapping practices, and emergency checklists into a controlled manual.	Years
Telemetry expansion	Expand remote visibility, data-age alarms, abnormal-runtime alarms, and pressure and storage monitoring.	Years
Millstone station replacement and automatic-isolation review	Replace the station and evaluate downstream-vacuum or loss-of-pressure shutoff with firefighting safeguards and an operator override.	Approximately two years if approved
Clay County line extension and emergency interconnect	Complete preliminary engineering and pursue congressionally directed funding for a second-source interconnect that could feed the system from the far end of the West Fork segment during a major failure.	Years
Second complete emergency response tool set	Acquire and organize a second complete set of critical response tools so deployment does not depend on one vehicle.	Months to years
Segment-pattern spreadsheet and operating baseline	Compare segment usage and operating behavior to distinguish heat-related or other legitimate demand from a developing leak; collect at least one full year of baseline data.	Years

7. Conclusion

The mechanical repair of the failed 8-inch bell-and-spigot joint was successful, and full service was restored on July 21. Most of the elapsed time between the initial response and system restoration was spent locating and isolating the leak, rather than performing the joint repair. The PSD employees performed as well as possible with the information available and the conditions encountered during the incident. Leak localization was prolonged by difficulty locating and correctly identifying sectional valves, incomplete field mapping, the need to refill upstream storage between tests, and an erroneous understanding of the area isolated by one valve. After the leak was found, improper dirty fill and large debris, contractor equipment mobilization, corrective bedding work, and tool-readiness problems added time to excavation and repair. Remediation of many of the issues identified in this report began before the incident and remains ongoing. District performance will continue to improve as these measures are implemented. Immediate priorities are valve location and marking, dependable mapping access, standardized tool inventories and checklists, and written isolation and restoration procedures. Longer-term work should address telemetry, the proposed Millstone automatic-isolation function, vulnerable main segments, the Clay County emergency interconnect and second-source project, and other resilience improvements as engineering and funding permit.

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